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Abstract 
The events of September 11th 2001 increased the attention of 
Western public towards religious activism in Germany. In fact, 
this country had become a shelter for radicalized Islamic activists 
involved in the terrorist attacks. At the same time, the growing 
domestic violence performed by organized right-wing activists 
urged the German state to increase pressure on the German 
right-wing movement. In part, these attacks were related to a 
terrorist cell called National Socialist Underground (NSU). This 
cell is said to be closely related to the National Democratic Party 
of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
hereinafter NPD). 
Since then, the public debate about migration, Islam and the 
German society has undergone significant changes while the 
government of the Federal Republic has become interested in 
controlling and labeling each protest movement, whichever their 
affiliation may be, left, right or religious. In the case of the 
Islamist movement Hizb-ut-tahrir (Party of Liberation), this 
resulted in the banning of its activities from the country. The 
NPD, although still legal, barely survived an authority ban 
attempt in 2003. 
The dissertation’s main research question is how repression by the 
state affects the Protest mobilization, in particular public 
communication, of the Right-wing and the Islamist movements. More 
specifically, the goal is to see how these movements mobilize 
within changing conditions of the political environment, namely 
in the presence, or absence, of a more or less serious possibility 
of legal banning, which obviously would exert a significant deal 
of pressure on the movement. 
 
XV 
 
The claim-making that the Islamist and radical right-wing 
movement address to the public and their adherents constitutes 
the unit of analysis of this thesis. In order to define these claims, 
it is necessary to document protest claims and actions within the 
selected time frame, which covers the period between 2000 and 
2011. The data set is mainly consisting of publications, articles 
and documents released by both movements. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction  
 
The events of September 11th 2001 increased the attention of 
western public towards Islamist activism. In fact, Germany had 
been a shelter for radicalized Islamic activists who were involved 
in the terrorist plot of 2001. Having politicized Islam through 
their rhetoric, Islamist activists participate in violent conflicts in 
Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, for example. 
 
These conflicts have been imported by migrants from the regions 
of origin into the countries of immigration. At the same time, the 
growing domestic violence, performed by organized right-wing 
activists, urged the German state to increase pressure on the 
German right-wing movement1. After the reunification, 
Germany faced a severe phase of radical right-wing violence 
against immigrants and asylum seekers. This violence reached its 
deadly peak at the beginning of the 1990s, when Turkish 
immigrants became victims of arson attacks in the cities of 
Moelln and Solingen (Koopmans et. al. 2005: 3). 
 
Within ten years after the Islamist terrorist attacks of September 
11th, Germany discovers that a wave of Right-wing terrorist 
turns against its own citizens. A terrorist cell called National 
Socialist Underground (NSU) - being responsible for the 
murderer of a significant number of immigrants - is seemingly 
closely related to the (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 
NPD. This is particularly noteworthy for the NPD, which barely 
survived a legal ban attempt in 2003 due to formal legal 
mistakes.   Since then, public debate has changed about 
                                                 
1 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/nazi-a11.shtml  (10.03.2011) 
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migration, Islam and the German society. While the government 
of the Federal Republic is highly interested in controlling and 
labeling each protest movement, be it from the left, right or the 
Islamist scope, each movement adapts to the given institutional 
and discursive opportunities. 
 
In particular, the radical right-wing and the Islamist party are 
paradoxically related to each other. Although the right-wing and 
the Islamist movement antagonize each other, they share 
common denominators favoring disintegration as well as racially 
or culturally homogenous communities. 
 
The selection of two marginalized groups, which at the edge of 
public and society, claim for societal change, confronts research 
with limited information and thin access to movement and state 
actors. This dissertation aims to answer how two radical 
movements react toward state pressure, changing their 
communication and protest tactics. 
 
Political studies focused on rational and institutional approaches 
looking at movements from a macro perspective, aggregating 
data on state policies to describe the relationship between state 
and movement. While Political Science examines institutional 
measurements such as legal instruments (court decisions and 
police action) applied by the State, they mainly focus on political 
parties. Social movement studies rather extend the field of 
investigation including parties and social groups that belong to a 
broader movement (Minkenberg 2003: 32). 
 
The dissertation fits in the literature of social movement studies 
and their theoretic sub-strand on repression and mobilization. 
Furthermore, it will consider elements of the theoretical 
3 
 
framework of discursive opportunity structures, which affect the 
claim-making of social movements. 
 
While there is a rich social movement literature on student, 
peace, ecological, gender and human rights movements (Rucht 
2001; Della Porta 1995) depicting in detail their extraordinary 
protest in local and global perspectives, right-wing and religious2  
movements have barely been studied in this discipline. The 
dissertation focuses in particular on the German National 
Democratic Party, the right-wing party NPD 
(Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the movement 
party Hizb-ut-tahrir (Party of Liberation) that was banned by the 
Minister for Interior in 2003. 
 
The claim-making of the Islamist movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir 
and radical right-wing party NPD to the public, and their 
adherents, through communication messages, constitutes the 
unit of analysis in this dissertation. Studies deriving from social 
movement literature have up until nowadays separately paid 
attention to the Islamist movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir, for 
example, and their claim-making after the Danish Muhammad 
cartoon, (Lindekilde 2008). Also, the right-wing movement 
conducted studies separately, when Giugni et.al list discursive 
                                                 
2 American scholars have deeply investigated the emergence of Christian 
religious movements and their impact on United States politics. European 
scholars investigated the impact of the Catholic Church during the cold war era 
and its role during the Polish and East German unrest against the socialist bloc 
(Kniss/Burns 2004: 702f.).With religious movements, I only refer to Islamic 
activism that shares a few common aspects with contemporary social 
movements (e.g. Wiktorowicz 2004). Thereby, my dissertation focuses only on 
Islamist activists within the Islamist movement. Henceforth, the selected case 
will be presented as part of the Islamist movement. 
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opportunities that affect right-wing claim-making and lead to 
diverse mobilization options in Germany and four European 
countries (Giugni et.al 1999). Claim-analysis comprises the 
discursive elements in public including speeches, articles and 
documents published by the movements (Koopmans et.al. 2005: 
23). The theoretical framework of discursive opportunity 
analyses the movements affected by specific opportunity 
structures, national context and political space when mobilizing 
protest. 
 
The complex process of protest includes the examination of State, 
media and counter groups; and the merging of movement 
leaders, who interact with adherents and the public to persuade 
and influence them in favor of acceptance and support for the 
mobilization of their movement. Protest communication through 
the claim-making of the Islamist and the radical right-wing 
movement should distinguish between interaction processes and 
interpretation schemata in periods of existential pressure by the 
State. 
 
The intensive study of claim-making improved the 
understanding of the claim-making of the radical right-wing 
(Koopmans et.al. 2005: 188). Radicalization and/or moderation of 
rhetoric is the results of calculated rational decisions or pure 
survival strategies of protest movements. Trough the media, 
both protest movements were addressees of legislation and 
visible to the public. They also received democratic rights such 
as freedom of assembly and access to media. Their framing 
strategies and protest mobilization depend on discursive 
opportunity structures. The consequences of their protest 
communication reveal how marginalized protest movements 
apply communication tactics and develop long-term protest 
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strategies in democracies. In other words, how does state 
repression in a democratic society such as Germany affect two 
radical protest movements? 
 
Thus, the outgoing research deals with the question as to how 
repression by the state affects the Protest mobilization of the Right-
wing and the Islamist movement, in particular the public 
communication. The thesis analyses whether these movements 
become moderate or radicalize their communication. Both of the 
indicated movements are confronted with constant pressure and 
the threat of legal sanctions. 
 
The initial thought behind this thesis was to explain the reaction 
of movements that are marginalized and  enjoy low societal 
acceptance. From a normative point of view, the initial interest 
began to shake the interaction between the democratic State and 
its challengers beyond the common friend and foe analyses. 
There is no doubt about the necessity for a democracy to defend 
its pluralistic order against groups, which are seeking to 
implement an illiberal State and societal order. At the same time, 
groups with different social and political ideas have to be 
tolerated and, as a consequence, they need to be granted freedom 
(Klump 2004: 339). 
 
When comparing the right-wing movement with the Islamists 
movement, the question why they should have anything in 
common and, thus, be compared immediately comes up. At the 
first glance, both movements have little in common. Different 
ideologies and differing socio-cultural backgrounds seem to 
collide with the concept of a direct comparison (Dantschke 2009). 
On closer examination, right-wing and Islamists share coincident 
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meetings and cooperation back in the 1920s (Kuentzel 20073 ; 
Whine 2006). Since the 1990s, Hizb-ut-tahrir has begun its 
activities in Germany. Its communication activities and claim-
making regarding several social, cultural and political issues are 
similar to those of the right-wing NPD. This is why, at the end of 
2002, Hizb-ut-tahrir Germany and its leading member Shaker 
Assam, organized a congress meeting at the technical University 
of Berlin with the title: Iraq – a new war and its consequences4. 
Young Muslims, including students and well educated 
sympathizers welcomed this event. The invitation of two leading 
NPD members, Horst Mahler and Udo Voigt was highly 
controversial amongst Hizb-ut-tahrir members (Dantschke 2009: 
441). Many feared that the party would lose intellectual and/or 
religious supporters. Supporters, in their opinion, would feel 
insulted by the attempt to cooperate with a German racist and 
extremist party, which had nothing but one goal in mind: to 
deport and exclude all Muslim immigrants from Germany. Also, 
the German state might find an incentive to increase pressure on 
Hizb-ut-tahrir, once it forms extremist allies. 
 
The self-perception of the members of the right-wing and the 
Islamist movement as deprived socioeconomic losers is a 
common denominator. This self-image is the result of their 
conviction of being persecuted by law in a globalized and 
dominated order. For the Hizb-ut-tahrir, religion and the final 
goal to restore the caliphate become the main unifying drive, 
which is de-territorial and free from boundaries of any kind. The 
right-wing movement relies highly on the ‚nation‛ as a concept 
and depends, therefore, on the territory. In particular, Hizb-ut-
                                                 
3http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/080ruyh
g.as (21.04.2011) 
4 Der Spiegel 47/2002. 
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tahrir and NPD include social and cultural issues to attract the 
attention of wider groups of the population. The right-wing 
party NPD and the Islamist party organization Hizb-ut-tahrir 
position themselves within a broader movement to adapt better 
ad hoc changes, being less bound to party objectives such as 
conventional political parties. 
 
Specific about Germany, whose political and institutional 
characteristics provide a unique setting to examine the impact of 
state policies on social movements, is the limited political 
opportunity structure for movements once facing the opposition 
of societal treaties and its institutions. State repression in 
Germany does not depend on party preferences like in Italy's 
progressive 1960´s (Della Porta 1995). Also, it does not adapt UK 
open dialogue policies that have been set as an option for the 
government to deal with radical right or Islamist movements. 
Also, it cannot be compared with tolerant secular policies like in 
Denmark (Valentine 2010; Caver/Ege 2004). The German state 
uses its institutional strength through the Federal Ministry of 
Interior increasing pressure and eventually banning those 
groups and/or movements that are perceived as a threat to the 
‚Free democratic basic order‛. 
 
German interior policy can be described as rather exclusive with 
tendencies to polarize conflicts with challenging groups (Kriesi 
et al. 1995). Both, the involvement of NATO forces in 
Afghanistan and the marginalization of Muslims through strict 
anti-terrorist security policies of the German state are two main 
protest issues for Hizb-ut-tahrir. The German right-wing party 
NPD expresses its dissonance against the military intervention in 
Afghanistan as well as against the repression policies of the state 
against the right-wing after a number of severe right-wing 
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violence. Despite the fact of NPD being an institutional actor and 
legitimate parliamentarian party, the party is mostly confronted 
with a closed institutional setting, seldom passing 5% thresholds 
to access local parliaments and excluded from main discussions 
in the mass media. Its weak position in the political and 
institutional sphere explains its permanent protest activities 
outside of the institutional arena, where any topic - be it 
international, and domestic - is brought up to attract public 
attention. 
 
Compared to other European countries, Germany has a high 
presence in the field of policies related to migration. The radical 
right-wing movement of Germany has proportionally raised a 
higher rate of unspecific xenophobic claims against migrants in 
the public sphere, outside of the institutional arenas by extra-
parliamentarian associations and organizations (Koopmans et.al. 
2005: 199). Two protest arenas which both belong to the public 
are instrumentalized for that purpose. The first arena is the street 
where adherents can be mobilized in advance. Hizb-ut-tahrir 
and NPD are tightly organized and highly top-down 
movements, as opposed to bottom up grassroots movements 
(Heinrich 2008; Hamid 2007: 147). Events such as street 
demonstrations have been crucial for Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD. 
These events demonstrate to their supporters and opponents that 
the movements have the capability to lead an entire movement 
and to get an overview of the people joining them and attending 
their events. The second arena is the media sphere shifting a 
major part of their claim-making to the internet (Kleinschmidt 
2009: 374f). The same factor applies to Hizb-ut-tahrir, which 
refuses to participate to public life as a parliamentarian party, 
representing Muslim immigrants at the institutional level. 
Instead, it follows a disintegrative approach in favor of 
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exclusion. It operates with injustice frames such as cultural 
oppression of Muslims by the west in order to undermine 
Muslim organizations and detach immigrants from their local 
communities. Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD’s have one central claim 
in common: that is protest for exclusion. The Islamist movement 
advertizes for a catch-all solution: the re-establishment of the 
caliphate in the Middle East and North African region that will 
unite all Muslim against ‚western injustice and exploitation‛ and 
the right-wing movement is more than pleased to help all 
Muslims to return to their ‚homeland‛. 
 
Thus, I regard Hizb-ut-tahrir and NPD as protest movement 
actors throwing their claims into the public. I will use the protest 
definition of Rucht et al. (Rucht et al. 1998:9). They define protest 
as following: ‚collective protest can be understood as a public 
expression of dissent or critique that is often combined with 
making claims which, if realized, would affect the interests of 
particular groups in society‛. As Rucht generalizes, those who 
protest are against a situation and in favor of an attitude. Protest 
would involve interaction including activists, observers, passive 
participants and police and counter protests. 
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Chapter 3.  
Islamism as a Social Movement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with Islamism and its narrative and 
interpretative contexts. They are particularly relevant for the 
understanding of Islamism as a social movement. For scholars 
working on social movements, the description of language, 
terms and definitions are shaped by and bound to historical and 
social contexts, mainly of the western society (Bayat 2005: 892). 
Most strands of the Islamist movement reject any adaptation to 
western terms and ideas like protest, globalization and 
modernity7. Thus, when borrowing terms such as anti-
capitalism, globalization or equality and applying them to the 
narrative of Islamist movement, one has to be very careful and 
adopt a critical approach. When fundamentalist clerics 
denounced Israel and the United States as exploiters of Muslim 
culture and soil, their messages were received and interpreted in 
various ways by Muslim addressees as opposed to a western 
audience. When religious preachers call for ‚cleansing infidels 
out to purify the holy country‛, one might interpret it as an act of 
national, transnational or religious liberation (Thomas 2005: 90).  
 
It might be an act to establish, protect or expand a pan-Islamic 
state Caliphate, hence, the focus on the narrative and 
interpretative context. For instance, modern Salafists address 
young Muslims to protest against the establishment denying 
young Muslims access to full social and cultural equality and 
                                                 
7  Interview with Hizb-ut-tahrir press representative  (2010) 
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they encourage them these Muslims to reject their identity. Islam 
becomes the interpreted source of self-determination. The 
Salafist adherents identify themselves through common dresses 
and symbols such as the niqab and burka for women or the long 
beard and calve covering thaub for men (Hemmingsen 2011: 
1212). Also, individuals may share common cultural values, 
independent of race, ethnicity or the social class. Islam becomes 
the common denominator. Also, perceived opportunities are 
crucial to explain how movement members and adherents 
perceive their action, be it violent or non-violent.  
 
 
3.2 The emergence of Islamism 
 
As a consequence of the migration waves of the 1970s and 1980s, 
religious movements were experiencing a resurgence of 
mobilization in response to globalization processes. Salafism 
encouraged Muslim immigrants to follow the pure Islam based 
on the era of its prophet Muhammad. In the emerging phases of 
the 1970s and 1980s, religious movements were expanding their 
ideologies as a kind of Weltanschauung. The most important 
ideologues were Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahab (1703-1792), 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Hassan Al-Banna (1906-
1949) and Sayid Qutb (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 124). These 
ideologues succeeded in connecting theory with practice, 
inspiring political activists to follow their ideologies and to 
politicize Islam in the Middle East and North African regions.  
 
For instance, fundamentalism as a political activism does contest 
some aspects of modernity and western culture. In an emerging 
global order, Islamic fundamentalism competes with the western 
models of secularism, nationalism and liberal democracy. Some 
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fundamentalist ideologies, like the Islamist movement of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, combined nationalist aspirations with a 
religious agenda.  
 
Also, Islamists organize protest involving new issues such as 
gender, sexuality and identity, which are important to the young 
Muslims generation in Western Europe (Husain 2007: 67). The 
Islamist movements tend to interpret Islam in favor of their 
organizations. The on-going social and cultural exclusion of 
young Muslim immigrants in western societies provides a 
unique opportunity to the Islamist movement to promote Islam 
as the only solution for young Muslims.  
 
Islamists motivate young Muslims to raise their opposition 
against their parents, detach them from nationalist sentiments 
towards their countries of origin and offer them the ‚chance‛ to 
be part of a bigger, more powerful global community. This way, 
young Muslims would overcome exclusion and isolation. 
Enabling Muslims to belong to a community, whose solidarity 
goes beyond every ethnic and national boundaries, Islam and its 
religious form of expression turn into a visible form of protest 
against racism and anti-Islamic rhetorics (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 
126). Simultaneously, religion becomes a tool for mobilization, 
which represents cultural identities and promotes religion as a 
marker of social control (Schmidt 2011: 1227).   
 
The emergence of the Islamist movement, by including cultural 
and religious issues, adds a new dimension that goes beyond the 
regular left-right scope of social movements. Its orientation 
towards the inclusion of Islamic culture and the religion of Islam 
as its central values underlines the relevance of Islamist 
movements for the literature of political sciences and sociology, 
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in particular social movements (Wiktorowicz 2004; Reetz 2004: 
67). The commonalities that enable the Islamist movement to 
unify and mobilize protest action share general belief, language 
and symbolic codes as well as the advocacy of Islam as part of 
the Muslim public life, and, also, the expression of religious and 
political change in society (Bayat 2005: 900).  
 
Often, the scholarship tends to portray Islamism either as an 
anti-modernist and reactionary movement, whose goal is to 
oppose modernization and religious pluralism, or as a reaction 
to postmodernism, representing cultural autonomy and 
alternative identity (Bayat 2005: 894; Reetz 2004: 62).  
 
In particular, Islamism was explained as an anti-capitalist and 
anti-liberalist movement, which would mobilize ‚tribal 
resistance for identity and community‛ against ‚neoliberal 
globalism‛ and a universalistic secular order (Lindholm/Zuquete 
2010: 8). As Bayat summarizes when mapping religious 
movement across scholarly literature, ‚these movements are said 
to be anti-democratic and regressive by character. On the right, 
the `clash of civilization´, proposed by Bernard Lewis and 
popularized by Samuel Huntington, manifests the framework 
within which the ´anti-modern´ character of such movements in 
their encounter with Western modernity is assessed. On the left, 
one can point Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine, among 
others, who express concern about religious revivalism. 
´Regressive utopianism´ and ´anti-movement´ are the ways they 
refer to religious including the Islamic, movements.‛ (Bayat 
2005: 894). Melucci´s reference to religious movements, which 
defines identity in drawing a historical path to an idealized past, 
including an Utopianism as the upcoming project, come closest 
to the description of the Islamist movement.       
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Islamism, instead, is not a homogenous monolith in static form 
but a heterogeneous social movement in constant shift, whose 
fundaments are founded and embedded in the Islamic society. 
Moreover, the Islamist movement is not only mobilizing support 
for its claims in politically closed Muslim societies. Being cross-
boundary, transnational Islamist movement organizations 
operate in European societies with advanced technical media 
tools, addressing people on the basis of a common identity and 
‚generalized belief‛ and ‚shared values‛ (Bayat 2005: 892). 
Structuralist approaches of the social movement literature such 
as the resource mobilization theory by Mc Carthy and Zald 
(1977) mainly focused on American and European social 
movements, emphasizing the relevance of rationalist models as 
partial motives for action. Bayat criticizes the overstretched focus 
of structuralist approaches written by Tarrow on movement 
outcome and its dependence on political opportunity structures 
(Bayat 2005: 898). According to Tarrow, social movement 
outcomes mainly depend on the changing structures of political 
opportunities that enable them to fail or to raise and challenge 
state authorities for social and political change (Tarrow 1994: 86). 
However, the demand for structural change is integrated within 
the ideological body of some Islamists such as Hizb-ut-tahrir 
when communicating their political agenda to the public.  
 
While on the one hand, rationalist models were used to explain 
Islamist emergences throughout Muslim-majority countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s, social theorists on the other hand, borrowed 
concepts such as the Weberian charismatic leadership to 
rationalize revolutionary movements such the Iranian revolution 
led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. Islamism has been described 
as a partial derivation of Marxism, emerging out of the material 
necessity for societal change (Bayat 2005: 896). Weberian 
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scholars, instead, grouped religious adherents as one cluster 
whose driving motor would be a belief system dependent on 
symbols and ideas. Hence, the leader would use its charisma to 
unify and mobilize the movement (e.g. Bayat 2005: 896). Like 
Tarrow´s opportunity structures approach, Weberian scholars 
rarely tend to look at the impact societal and state conditions 
have on the dynamic and, hence, argumentative rhetoric of 
movements. Instead, contemporary social movement theorists 
have been concerned with the role of social movement actors as 
challengers of the polity struggling for power (Tarrow 1994; 
Bayat 2005). It is thus legitimate to ask whether movement action 
has changed social discourse and opportunities of the movement 
itself.  
 
Islamists seek for recognition among the Muslims community, 
aiming to demonstrate their religious and political knowledge in 
order to increase their legitimacy. Islamists are eager to dominate 
discourses on religious freedom, no matter whether they are led 
by religious Muslims, moderate Muslim organizations or by 
other Islamist organizations. The former are perceived and 
discredited as westernized Muslims who cooperate with the 
‚Kafr‛, unbelievers who are represented by western States and 
suppress the Muslims community ‚umma‛ (Metzger 2002: 10). 
The latter are perceived as competitors and discredited as 
Islamists who either follow the wrong path, or work for 
illegitimate Arab regimes, which in turn are functioning as 
western puppets. Islamist groups aim to dominate the discourse 
within the Muslim community, binding religious, social and 
political issues to the local or national context. Hence, the 
strategic goal of the Islamist movement is to legitimize its 
presence with the claim to represent a fictive Muslim monolith 
against an oppressing west.  
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3.3 The four strands of Islamism and the Caliphate  
 
This section will introduce the concepts for Caliphate and Jihad for 
the purpose of clarification. Especially after September 11th, most 
media and political representatives began to relate political and 
social actions by Muslims to Islamism.  
 
Islamism functions as the general term for every Muslim group, 
independent of whether it attaches itself to the Salafi and Wahabi 
or to a different strand. The term Islamism characterizes all 
Muslim strands, which combine every element of Islam with 
societal and the political matters and claim Islam to be the 
solution for each problem (El Difraoui 2012: 7).  
 
Islamism contains different strands, with similarities and 
differences. Islamic fundamentalism, Salafism, Wahabism and 
Jihadism constitute the four main strands of Islamism. Before 
Islamism dominated the discourse in public and media, Islamic 
fundamentalism became publicly and scholarly visible to the 
world as an outcome of the Iranian social movement in 1979 
(Denoeux 2002: 61). Its call for restoring the original purity and 
literal reading of the Quran and its rejection of a concrete 
political project is one of the main characteristics of Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
 
Despite its theological claim for quietism (Buchta 2004), Shiite 
Islamic fundamentalism showed its political and militant 
components, when clerics entered politics after the victory of the 
Iranian revolution. In order to export the ‚Islamic revolution‛, 
the clergy legitimated militant actions inside and outside of Iran, 
declaring a Fatwa, a religious judgment authorized by a highly 
qualified clergyman against all infidels and enemies of Islam 
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(Mozaffari 1998: 86ff.). The consequence was the foundation of 
‚Hizbollah‛ (Party of God) and its engagement in south Lebanon 
as an opposing force against the State of Israel as well as against 
Christian militias in the Lebanon civil war (Walt 1996: 246). 
Salafism is one strand of Islamism, which theologically is close to 
Wahabism. Al Salafiyya or ahl al Salaf can be translated as followers 
of the pure tradition of the prophet Muhammad (Abou-Taam 
2012a). Salafist preachers have become popular among young 
Muslims in Germany and other western countries as they 
combine youth rhetoric and pop culture with Islamic dogma 
(Dantschke 2007: 3). They teach a pure practice of Islam that 
returns to the life of the life of Muhammad and his companions. 
Salafism can be regarded as a protest strand of Islam against 
modernity. Also, it rejects the narrative forms of Islam hadith that 
begun to depict Islam in the 7th century A.D. Consequently, it 
rejects Sufi cults and the cult of saints as one can find in Shiite 
Islam (Denoeux 2002: 58), for example. Warning Muslims not to 
follow blindly textual interpretations of Islam, Salafist thinkers 
call every Muslim to interpret and reason their words and 
actions individually (Reetz 2004: 64). Similarly to Hizb-ut tahrir, 
the Salafists proclaim a caliphate and strongly reject any form of 
nationalism and citizenship based on territory and ethnicity and 
language. The global Muslim community umma is politicized as 
the pool for economic, social and cultural resistance against 
western systems and constitutes the midpoint of the Salafist 
movement (Abou-Taam 2012a).  
 
It was the Arab preacher Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahab in the 
Arabian Peninsula, to establish Wahabism in the 18th century 
(Antes 1997: 55). Similarly to Salafism, Wahabism is strict in 
condemning decadence and moral corruption in society. The 
state of ignorance Jahiliiya and the rejection of God are 
39 
 
considered to be the greatest heresies. Wahabism is characterized 
by its strict interpretation of the Sunna and Quran as well as by 
the intolerance towards any deviant form of interpretation 
(Metzger 2002: 25). From the theological point of view, 
Wahabism is an ultra-orthodox and isolated strand of Islam; 
however, it has become powerful and political when allying with 
the house of Saud in 1745 (Denoeux 2002: 59). Thanks to its 
alliance with the Saudi family who had unified all Arab tribes 
under their control, Wahabism became a state controlled 
ideology and the main strand of Islam in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, as well as its State doctrine. Thanks to oil supplies of 
Saudi Arabia and its ambition to engage overseas from Bosnia to 
the Malaysia, Wahabism spread over a large territory and 
became a transnational ideology. Materially and logistically 
supported by the Saudi State, mosques, Islamic centers, religious 
schools Madrasas and Universities were built in Europe, Africa 
and Asia (Metzger 2002: 28). In 1979, Sunni Wahabism did not 
only become a major ideology spreading in revolutionary Iran 
with an expanding Shiite Islamism. At the same time, it served as 
a source of mobilization for Afghan, Pakistani and Arab 
Mujhaheddin fighters against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.   
 
Jihadism is derivated from Jihad, which literally means ‚effort‛. In 
the era of the prophet Muhammad, it was understood as the 
‚holy fight for the will of God‛ and, thus, Jihad was given a 
military interpretation (Antes 1997: 39). Besides its military 
interpretation, Jihad has a religious and civilian meaning. It is 
interpreted as an invitation dawa to Islam (Reissner 2007: 26). 
Also, it calls Muslims to express solidarity to the poor, an effort 
to reduce famine and an effort to build shelter for the weak and 
homeless in the Muslim community.  
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The Islamic law Sharia legitimizes Jihad in case of Muslims 
living in the State of war ‚dar al harb‛,  forcing them to defend 
their State of Peace ‚dar al Islam‛ against decadence ‚taqut‛ and 
the State of ignorance ‚jahiliya‛. These aspects legitimate 
justifications to struggle for the Islamic State (Khosrokhavar 
2011: 19). Adherents of the Jihadi strand of Islamism perceive 
themselves as the defenders and executors of Jihad, defending 
the Islamic community umma and the Islamic State, the Caliphate 
or khilafah. Islamist ideologues such as Nabhani - founder of 
Hizb-ut tahrir or the England based Umar Bakri - introduced the 
method of khilafah. It subordinates Islamic activism under one 
final goal, which indicates the establishment of the Islamic State 
khilafah. The establishment of the Caliphate or khilafah is divided 
in three main phases. First, Muslims are urged to Islamize the 
society and convince the faithless and infidels kuffar to convert to 
Islam. Second, having established the Islamic State, Muslims are 
not entitled to wage war against other Muslims or the kuffar. 
They do need the authorization of the Caliph to engage in an 
armed struggle. Jihad can only be legitimated by the Caliph of 
the Caliphate, whose legitimacy, based on the rule of god and 
religious wisdom, entitles him to call Muslims for Jihad. Hence, 
the Caliphate guarantees stability and political order for Muslim 
and non-Muslims. The political implications of Jihad were 
formulated by Islamist thinkers in the middle of 20th century. 
Ideologues such as Mawdudi8, Al- Banna or Sayiyd Qutb9, not 
                                                 
8 Mawdudi found the organization Jamaat Islami (Islamic society) on the Indian 
subcontinent. His idea of a Muslim community was tailored to the Indian 
context and became the driving force of Islamic identity in Pakistan in 1941 
(Khosrokhavar 2011: 20). According to Mawdudi, a slow Islamization would be 
necessary even by the use of force (Husain 2007: 50).  
9 Qutb who began his career as a secular Egyptian state employee, slowly 
radicalized after he visited the United States and perceived their decadence as 
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only called every Muslim to regard Jihad as his/her hitherto duty 
but demanded his/her participation in Jihad (Khosrokhavar 2009: 
42). The establishment of the caliphate is achieved through a 
chain of phases, which would implement a chronological order. 
These would be the spread of ideas, the use of intellect, the share 
of thoughts, the challenge for Muslims and the Western allies, 
the conceptualization of systems, the development of concepts, 
the destruction of the western puppet regimes and the 
construction of the caliphate (Husain 2007: 50). 
 
The Islamic State would be ruled by wise and well guided Caliph 
or hakim, which would be free of moral and material defect of the 
West (Khosrokhavar 2012: 20). The Islamic State, caliphate or 
khilafah, was a political project that was supposed to include 
regulatory elements for government through a religious council, 
Shura. In the era of the 7th century A.D. and after the death of the 
prophet Muhammad, the pretense to extend the territorial 
borders of the caliphate were limitless. A transnational caliphate 
was impossible to be governed as different rivals violently 
contested for the succession Muhammad (Antes 1997: 51). This 
led to the schism between the Sunni and Shiia strand of Islam. 
During the era of Muhammad, the caliphate remained bound to 
territorial borders. Today, the caliphate remains a political utopia 
but exists as a real political agenda for the Islamist movement, in 
particular Hizb-ut tahrir (Reissner 2007: 23). 
                                                                                                           
the main cause for societal decline. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood and 
participated in protests against the Egyptian government. His ideas radicalized 
during his stay in prison. Qutb’s thoughts drew a society, which would be 
divided between good and evil with the necessity to implement the Islamic 
Sharia law and be at war Jihad with all those who would oppose the Islamic 
State and society (Metzger 2002: 30).        
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With regard to the caliphate, which for instance functions as the 
main political project of the Islamist Hizb-ut tahrir, it is 
necessary distinguish between the Sunni caliphate and the Shiia 
‚Velayat e faqih‛. In 1979, radical Shiite clerics followed Ayatollah 
Khomeini who established the Islamic government based on the 
concept ‚government of the jurist‛ Velayat e faqih. This concept 
was written and theorized by Ayatollah Khomeini and tailor-
made to the leader of the Islamic revolution himself (Khomeini 
1981). Khomeini’s Islamic government left no space for the 
concept of the caliph and criticized its imprecise and loose 
utopian configuration (Buchta 2004: 83).  
 
Indeed, the caliphate is not designed for a single country, but 
aims for the unification of the entire Muslim world to one society 
under one Islamic state. The caliphate turned out to be a utopian 
project for the Sunni Salafi and Jihadi Islamists, as no Sunni 
country has adopted this concept (Khosrokhavar 2012: 83), yet. 
No Arab country has voluntary allowed to universalize its 
material goods or allowed foreign groups to influence its 
policies. Considering what said before, the Jihadi mission to 
restore or construct the caliphate becomes endless. In contrast to 
Islamic fundamentalists, who regard the caliphate as a political 
system that should be attained through a calm societal transition 
in an indefinite future, the very existence of Jihadi Islamists 
depends on endless violent confrontation with the Jahiliya 
(Khosrokhavar 2012: 84).  
 
Despite of their differences, all strands of Islamism share an 
idealized narrative about the historical beginning of Islam, the 
prophet and the construction of the first caliphate.  
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 All of them represent Islam as the only social and 
political solution.  
 Wahabi, Salafi, Jihadists and Fundamentalists believe in 
the restoration of the caliphate as the ultimate goal, 
inscribed by the umma, the community of believers. 
 All Islamist strands use a religious language combined 
with practical examples familiar to every Muslim. 
 
Also, there are the following differences:   
 
 Salafi, Jihadists and fundamentalists claim to establish a 
khilafah, an Islamic government without national 
territorial boundaries. The Wahabi Islamists, who are 
loyal to the Saudi Arabian kingdom, do not accept such a 
khilafah.  
 
  Fundamentalists are concerned about arbitrary changes 
within the theoretical discourse and interpretation of 
religious terms. They call for a slow transformation of 
state and society by peaceful means. But the younger 
Islamists such as the Jihadi, Salafists and some Wahabi 
call for action to change state and society with peaceful 
and when necessary violent means.  
 
 Jihadists and Salafists are dependent on an endless Jihad 
to establish the caliphate in a global umma. In contrast, 
Islamic fundamentalists aim at Islamizing state and 
society. The Islamic government is a political project. 
 
 Women are totally neglected and denied a public role by 
the Wahabi Islamists. In contrast, Salafists and Jihadists 
support the education of woman, believing that proper 
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education and even active participation of women in the 
public sphere would serve Jihad and be a relevant 
constituent of the Islamic society as long as the family is 
protected and genders segregated. 
 
 
With respect to the heterogeneity of the Islamist social 
movement, one has to distinguish between ‚modern‛ young 
Islamists, who were born and raised in the western context, and 
‚anti-modern‛ clerical fundamentalists. Denoeux (2002) writes 
about the ambiguity of the relation between modern Islamists 
and fundamentalists; because of young Islamist’s little 
knowledge about religious jurisprudence and their pragmatic 
approach towards modern technical tools, they do not tend to 
follow orthodox clerics or even become one. On the contrary, 
they challenge the established positions of fundamentalist clerics 
who are traditionally highly educated and experienced clerics 
(Denoeux 2002: 63).  
 
In some cases, they compete for power and resources accusing 
each other to be infidels and puppets of the Un-Islamic kafr 
government. Again, while there should be no doubt about 
fundamentalists’ intentions to seize power, one should 
emphasize their first concern meaning to Islamize society and to 
purify its moral and value order. They do seek for political 
power but are more concerned with the influences of western 
culture in Islamic societies. Like the fundamentalist cleric 
Ayatollah Khomeini once said, revolution does not end with the 
downfall of the prior un-Islamic regime but with the cleansing of 
‚west-toxification‛ (Khomeini 1981). Fundamentalists regard the 
establishment of a truly Islamic society as a fair long-term 
perspective (Denoueux 2002: 64). On the other hand, Islamists 
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see the necessity of revolution in toppling the infidel regimes, 
which cooperate against the will and needs of the Umma.       
 
 
3.4 Hizb-ut-tahrir within Islamism 
 
In 1953, Hizb-ut tahrir (Party of Liberation) was founded by 
Taqiuddin an-Nabahani10. Born in Palestine, he was a Sheikh 
from a noble Arab family who was close to the Ottoman Empire. 
Unlike Mawdudi and Qutb, Nabhani studied Islamic Studies at 
the prestigious Al-Azhar University of Cairo (Husain 2007: 84). 
Nabhani’s experiences during the era of colonialism, 1928-1948, 
have had a great influence in shaping his ideas and views about 
Islam, Arabs and their relation to the world.  
 
The British mandate over Palestine was interpreted by many 
Arabs as occupation. From the Islamists point of view, a western 
power attempted to influence Muslim culture and to introduce 
its legal and social system by coercion. Having successfully 
sensed the national, religious and socio-cultural grievances of 
Arabs, Nabhani proceeded to adapt ideas, previously formulated 
by Islamists like Mawdudi about the Islamic State, adapting 
them to the political reality of the 1950’s (An-Nabhani 2002: 61). 
According to Nabhani, the return of the Jews and the foundation 
of the State of Israel only continues the occupation after the 
upheavals of World War II and ensure the occupation of Muslim 
land through a ‚Zionist movement‛ (Valentine 2010: 412).  
 
                                                 
10 http://hizb-america.org/about-us/prominent-members/170-sheikh-
muhammad-taqiuddin-al-nabhani (22.4.2012) 
46 
 
Hizb-ut-tahrir embodies the political party with Islamism at its 
core (Husain 2007: 84). Every Muslim has to be convinced of the 
wajib necessity to implement the Islamic State khilafah11. Only if 
Muslims realize the value and importance of the khilafah for the 
Muslim community and Islam, only then, the Islamic State will 
be constructed. The historical contextualization is relatively 
important to understand Hizb-ut-tahrir’s political agenda today. 
Since Hizb-ut-tahrir was banned in most Arab countries across 
the Middle East and many of its activists jailed, Hizb-ut- tahrir 
members began to request for political asylum in the United 
Kingdom or other West European countries (Valentine 2010: 
413).  
 
The Islamic State only serves as a utopia or long-term political 
project. Hizb-ut-tahrir introduces the khilafah as an intellectual 
and political anti-concept to western democracy. It regards 
democracy as a blasphemous Greek concept, rooted in demos and 
kratos – government by the people (Husain 2007: 78). Arab 
governments would have lost any legitimacy in the 1960s and 
1970s, as they followed the International system and refused to 
hear the call of Muslims to establish the only legitimate form of 
government, the Islamic State. Once the khilafah is established 
and wealth distributed, there would be no famine and poverty 
among Muslims. Then, Hizb-ut-tahrir would redistribute the 
wealth of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, sharing their oil 
among one Muslim nation ruled by one caliph12.  
 
Albeit Hizb-ut-tahrir does not call for violence in western States, 
it possesses a militant strand calling Muslims around the world 
                                                 
11 Statement of Hizb-ut-tahrir representative in Germany, Shaker Assem. (2009) 
12 http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/DE/def (22.4.2012) 
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to unite to one army, under one caliphate in order to defend 
Muslims against the disbelievers (Husain 2007: 81). In recent 
years, Islamist activities have increasingly focused on fragile 
countries, which are categorized as the so called failing states 
including Pakistan, Sudan, Ex-Yugoslavia and Uzbekistan13.   
 
When mapping Hizb-ut-tahrir within the Islamist movement, 
one should highlight how Hizb-ut tahrir distinguishes itself from 
traditional orthodox fundamentalism. There are three reasons, 
which explain why Hizb-ut-tahrir rather follows a self-
interpreted politicized approach similar to the Salafist strand but 
avoid close coalitions with Salafists14 or other Islamist groups. 
First, they interpret the narratives of Sunna and Quran 
independent from established Islamic schools and traditions. 
Hizb-ut tahrir perceives its religious and political agenda as the 
only path to lead the Muslims. Hizb-ut tahrir intentionally 
applies its own intellectual approaches with the ‚logic of 
argumentation‛ and ‚methodology‛. It aims to distinguish itself 
from Islamist groups. Each public meeting, with or without 
media presence15, is used as a public platform for Hizb-ut tahrir. 
It emphasizes its unique path and argues about ethical issues 
relating Hizb-ut tahrir’s political agenda of khilafah to current 
issues such as Muslim identity, social exclusion and migration. 
Second, they keep their political project, the khilafah, alive. Also, 
the idea of the Muslim community umma serves as a mobilizing 
tool for action to designate Hizb-ut-tahrir as part of a broader 
Muslim movement (Husain 2007: 76). Third, Hizb-ut-tahrir 
                                                 
13 Expert Interview, Claudia Dantschke (2011) 
14 The Salafist movement in Germany has become a protest movement that 
recruits young Muslims within the ‚Diaspora-Community‛ (Abou-Taam 
2012b) 
15 (Hizb-ut tahrir press conferences in Copenhagen 2010-2011) 
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discusses modern concepts such as liberal democracy and 
capitalism and combines them with its Islamist interpretation.  
 
Thus, Hizb-ut tahrir perceives itself as a political party standing 
within the Islamic community to establish an Islamic State: 
‚Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its 
objective is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an 
Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam and carries its 
call to the world. Hizb-ut-Tahrir has prepared a party culture, 
which includes a host of Islamic rules about life's matters. The 
party calls for Islam in its quality of intellectual leadership, from 
which the systems dealing with universal problems emanate: 
these include political, economic, cultural and social systems. 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a political party, which admits to its 
membership men and women, and calls all people to Islam and 
to adopt its concepts and systems. It views people according to 
the viewpoint of Islam, no matter how diverse their nationalities 
and their schools of thought are. Hizb-ut-Tahrir adopts the 
interaction with the Ummah in order to reach its objective and it 
struggles against colonialism in all its forms and attributes in 
order to liberate the Ummah from its intellectual leadership and 
to deracinate its cultural, political, military and economic roots 
from the soil of the Islamic lands. Hizb-ut-Tahrir endeavors to 
change the erroneous thoughts which colonialism has 
propagated, such as confining Islam to rituals and morals.‛16 
 
In contrast to other Islamist strands, Hizb-ut-tahrir includes 
women as an important part of society and refuses to ban them 
from public life, as long as both sexes live in society ruled by 
                                                 
16 http://english.hizbuttahrir.org/index.php/about-us (1.3.2012) 
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Islamic laws17. Corresponding with its competitive economic 
agenda, participation of women is welcomed as long as their 
responsibilities towards the ‚preservation of harmony in the 
family‛ will not be threatened. Hizb-ut tahrir attracts young 
Muslims who struggle to cope with adaption in western 
societies. It provides cultural and religious shelter for young 
Muslims18.  
 
In sum, two major differences distinguish Hizb-ut tahrir from 
other Islamist groups. First, Hizb-ut tahrir emphasizes the 
necessity of ideas, systems and concepts and second, the 
relevance of a methodology to establish its final goal. Yet, to 
establish the Islamic state, one needs to understand its political, 
social and cultural system. Political organization is a wajib, a 
necessity, to dominate Muslim discourse and gain political 
ascendancy (An-Nabhani, a). Hizb-ut tahrir is close to the 
position of other Islamist ideologues, when demanding the 
necessity for a radical political change as Qutb does in his epic 
Islamist book ‚Milestones‛. In the past, Arab nationalism and 
Marxism have shown that radical political change could be 
achieved, if a revolutionary movement would fully politicize and 
convince people of one idea for change. The Muslim is supposed 
to know his religious duties including prayer and fasting. Hizb-
ut tahrir expects its members to go further and to confront 
themselves with the ideas and concepts, which would suit the 
political empowerment of the party (Husain 2007: 92). The 
method of argument is placed in the first secret stage. Through 
talk and dialogue, Muslims need to convince each other of the 
                                                 
17 http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/DE/def   Hizb-ut tahrir constitution 
(21.6.2011) 
18http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/jugendkultur-islam-und-
demokratie/65147/demokratie-ist-eine-falsche-religion (12.2.2012) 
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existential necessity of the khilafah. The do need to organize 
themselves in groups and increase their political awareness and 
consciousness. Without determination for the Islamic State, no 
Muslim would live in a society of peace and shelter (An-Nabhani 
1998). Convincing Muslims and arousing their political 
awareness can only be accomplished through talk and dialogue 
as opposed to force. Hizb-ut tahrir introduces a three-state 
strategy to its members, explaining how to take over power: 
 
1. Secret Stage  
2. Open Stage 
3. Nusrah Stage (Assistance from powerful sources to take 
power) 
 
In the secret stage, activists organize study groups and a core to 
build up a political party. In the open stage, Muslim activists 
challenge the dominant political and social establishment, 
attempting to destroy and replace it with a new political and 
social form. A military coup or revolution would be the 
necessary completing assistance at the Nusrah stage (Husain 
2007: 93).    
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3.5 The Islamist Hizb-ut-tahrir 
 
While studies on Islamism concentrate on Salafist Jihadist and 
orthodox Wahabist, labeling them as unified sections of 
Islamism19, a closer differentiated view is advisable, as current 
Hizb-ut-tahrir is not a party but an organization that acts 
globally and widely. Like the nationalist right-wing party NPD, 
Hizb-ut-tahrir is one actor within a broad movement. Although, 
the movement party Hizb-ut-tahrir has no nationalist agenda, it 
is not to be defined as a pure fundamentalist or Salafist religious 
movement. It defines itself as a political idea that is able to unify 
Muslims under the banner of Islam without dependence on 
western values and a western oriented global order.  
 
                                                 
2 http://islamonline.com/ In 1928, Hassan Al Banna founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt. The Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi inspired and influenced 
Banna. Qaradawi advocates a democratic participation of Islamists is best 
known for the doctrine of wasatiyya (centrism), which lies between secularism 
and fundamentalism. He rejects the violent extremism of Al Qaeda and 
extremist doctrines of the Salafists. At the same time, he shares a common 
hostile stand towards the USA and Israel.  In contrast to the Salafists, Tariq 
Ramadan does not favor hudud (penalties) which include stoning of adulterers. 
Due to the failure of Muslim Brotherhood´s model of political participation, 
Salafists are gaining power and influence among Muslims in the Middle East. 
The flow of oil money including institutions and individuals has improved 
their position. The purity of Salafism offers simple answers to the questions 
and needs of Muslims in Europe who partly feel disintegrated and suffer a 
crisis of identity in the highly individualized western societies.   For some 
scholars, the difference between violent and non-violent Islamism does not 
mean to underestimate. Whereas violent Islamism would use violence to 
achieve its goals and seize state power, non-violent Islamism would undermine 
the culture of liberal democracy, exercising soft power to transform public 
culture across the Middle East and the west afterwards.  
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Hence, Hizb-ut-tahrir can be defined as a transnational Islamist 
movement organization belonging to what scholars define as a 
‚broader social movement that aims at the establishment and 
consolidation of a global community of Muslim believers in a 
politically and sociologically virulent sense. This includes non-
violent elements of transnational political Islam such as the 
various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as regional 
entrepreneurs spreading the vision of the global umma through 
the mass media.‛ (Friedrichs 2011:2). 
 
The main target groups, which have been addressed by the 
Islamist movement, belong to underprivileged classes. In most 
cases, the target group is young Muslim immigrants who live in 
Europe in the second or third generation (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2003: 
311). They come from less educated backgrounds and are less 
likely to benefit from the globalizing market economy, which 
appeals to include well-educated individuals20. Therefore, the 
protective, unifying and social message of religion is more likely 
to reach these groups. Competing in a market of ideas with other 
Islamist movement organizations such as Al-Muhajiroun, Hizb-
ut-tahrir aims to appeal to addressees, which are well educated 
and well integrated, too (Abbas/Siddique: 2012: 124). Conducted 
interviews with students and academics showed that this group 
of adherents does not necessarily suffer socio-economic 
deprivation. They protest against a dominant western order that 
                                                 
 
20 Brettfeld, Katrin/ Wetzels, Peter (2003) Junge Muslime in Deutschland: Eine 
kriminologische Analyse zur Alltagsrelevanz von Religion und 
Zusammenhängen von individueller Reiligiösität mit 
Gewalterfahrungen, -einstellungen- und handeln. In: Islamismus, 
Texte zur inneren Sicherheit, Bundesministerium des Inneren 
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seems to rule Muslims trying to oppress and ultimately abolish 
Muslim culture with its norms and rules. Hizb-ut-tahrir´s 
rhetoric is to some extent attractive to young Muslims, as it offers 
an alternative to traditional orthodox organizations that have 
failed to address the needs and feelings of young Muslim 
immigrants (Abbas/Siddique 2012: 125). Since 2000, immigrants 
with a Muslim background have faced a peculiar alienating 
climate through Islamophobia, racism, the negative impact of 
9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Gaza conflict and 
cultural and socioeconomic exclusion.  
 
Thus, Hizb-ut-tahrir´s claim-making based on these issues found 
partial support among a small group of Arab and Turkish 
immigrants in Germany, although this did not lead to 
radicalization and an outbreak of violence. It is wajib (necessary) 
for every Muslim to self-interpret and reason the logic of 
argumentation of Hizb-ut tahrir. This is one of the vasiliya (key 
means) of Hizb-ut-tahrir to address young Muslims. 
 
Besides its constant proposal to introduce the Sharia law in 
Muslim and a non-Muslim country, Hizb-ut-tahrir seeks for 
allies and a public audience to establish an Islamic state caliphate. 
Generally, its members avoid clear statements on contentious 
issues such as the place of non-Muslims in the Islamic state, the 
toleration of secular Muslims, or where the authority to interpret 
Islamic law should reside. Some might consider them as 
democrats but their positions are certainly not liberal. True 
believers and, thus, full members of the caliphate are those 
Muslims who are no heretics and consider Islamic norms, values 
and rules with respect to the Islamic Sharia law. Hizb-ut-tahrir 
understands secularism as a social and political attitude that 
cannot be accepted or tolerated among Muslims by any means. 
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In the contrary, Hizb-ut-tahrir considers its ideology confirmed, 
when referring to western public opinion surveys, which 
estimate a vast majority of Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan 
and Nigeria to support death penalty as punishment for crimes 
such as ‚apostasy‛ (PEW 2010: 14)21. Its revolutionary rhetoric 
for an uprising of Muslims may differ from other ‚established‛ 
Islamist actors within the movement, but its views on framing 
the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the Islamic community 
prove similarities. Separation between in-group and out-group 
and discriminating patterns of religious minorities can be found 
across Salafists, Wahabi and Shiia Islamists (e.g. Denoeux 2002: 
58). Despite a wide range of terms for infidels, Islamists address 
a number of subcategories that have been created to discriminate 
not only against Muslims and non-Muslims. They include kafir, 
harbi and mushrik, who are described as idolaters (Friedrichs 
2011: 14). One exception upgrading the status of non-Muslim 
religious minorities is the ‚people of the book‛ that eventually 
acknowledges Christians and Jews from other infidels.    
                                                 
21 Egypt:84%; Jordan:86%; Pakistan:76%; Nigeria:51%.  
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Chapter 4 
The radical Right-wing movement 
 
The German right-wing movement has experienced a structural 
and paradigmatic change. Initially, it has been strongly 
hierarchical and revisionist – claiming to review the national-
socialist past in 1950s. Parties pursuing to be represented in the 
parliament, like the NPD, became more pragmatic in the 1980s 
(Art 2011: 204-205). The radical right-wing movement, in 
particular the NPD, maintains nationalism at the top of its 
agenda but has begun to de-ideologize, shifting towards new 
topics such as immigration, social and economic policies 
(Koopmans 2001: 108).  
 
Within the last five decades the right-wing movement has faced 
a change regarding the issues, adherents and organizational 
structures. The claim-making of the radical right-wing 
movement was about revision and pro National Socialism in the 
1950’s and 1960’s. Immigration and ethnic issues have become a 
significant dominating protest issue since the unification of 
Germany (Koopmans 2001: 110f.). While, protests actions were 
structured and organized by parties and organizations in the 
1950’s and 1960’s, they became diffuse and less organized after 
the fall of the Berlin wall.  
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Table 1 Old and New NPD. Sources: Koopmans 2001; Art 2011: 204 
  
Old Right-wing NPD New Right-wing NPD 
Claims in 1950s and 1960s: Claims since 1990s: 
Ideology: Revisionist and pro NS 
regime 
 
Old disappointed members of 
NS 
Structure: Hierarchical, highly 
organized 
 
Party influence: Strong 
 
Party presence: Only West 
Germany 
No Immigration, pro welfare, 
family and child-care 
 
Young members 
 
Structure: Less organized 
 
Party influence: Decentralized, 
lose connection 
 
Party influence: Partly in West- 
mainly East Germany 
 
Their addressees are the less educated and/or unemployed 
people mainly coming from underprivileged classes (Stöss 2005: 
94)22. In its relatively young and peculiar history, the Federal 
Republic of Germany had to deal with several right wing and 
right extremist parties after the Second World War, including the 
German Nationalist Party NPD and the Republican Party.  
Despite organizational constraints, disastrous campaign affairs 
and political scandals, a few right-wing parties achieved to 
maintain within the political system.  Their goals are to protest 
against the established party system and capitalistic policies that 
collaborate against the ‚German people‛.  Hence the right-wing 
movement was successful in attracting sympathizers which are 
                                                 
22 Stöss, R. (2005) Rechtsextremismus in Wandel. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
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unsatisfied with their socioeconomic situation for they fear 
existential loss (Leggewie, 2003, p. 24).  
 
The right-wing movement divided its resources distinguishing 
between ‚block recruitment‛ and ‚individual recruitment‛.  The 
NPD possesses the largest amount of organizational and 
financial resources seeking to organize the block recruitment that 
attempts to integrate large groups of the population within its 
movement.  It tries to attract voters support with populist policy 
issues relating the agenda and the framing process of action to 
the cultural circumstances of the milieu of supporters.  It 
articulates the elements of democratic discourse and causes 
people from different classes of society to come together in 
agreement on certain issues, for instance against higher taxes 
(Puhle, 2003, p. 17).   
 
The number of supporters is on the rise, as it includes pure 
opportunist supporters, who sustain a single issue of the right-
wing party or organization.  Also, there are activists who have a 
strong belief system and share, above common ideas, the mind 
set of the right-wing group.  They have been non-violent at the 
beginning, but got more motivated and become violent later.  
When the group is weak the right-wing movement applies 
individual recruitment through sub-groups such as the youth 
organization NA. In both recruitment processes, leaders are 
crucial for recruitment and organization. However, their 
resources are limited trough restrictive mechanisms by state 
authorities, banning their web pages and controlling their social 
activities like concerts and marches.  ‚Political entrepreneurs‛ 
lead and organize the mobilization of the activists (Dalgaard-
Nielsen, 2008a, p. 6).  One of the most influential entrepreneurs 
was Juergen Rieger.  He supported the NPD with facilities and 
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huge amounts of financial aid23.  With his help, the NPD was 
able to support diverse right-wing movement actors in Germany. 
They were benefiting from his dense social networks across the 
Federal Republic.  
 
 
4.1 Right-wing extremism as a social movement 
 
The case study of the NPD provides an opportunity to overcome 
interdisciplinary boundaries of social movement research, party 
studies and populism are broken out. The concept of social 
movements does apply to the NPD, which acts within a 
heterogenic network of individuals, groups and associations in 
German society (Heinrich, 2008, p. 29). Although, not a classic 
protest party, the NPD tries to attract protest voters in the short-
term, expanding its set of issues to attract more individuals 
(Pfahl-Traughber, 2003, p. 48). As a legally recognized party, the 
NPD possesses a certain degree of organized bureaucratic 
structure and is financed by the State. This enables the NPD to 
bind Neo-Nazi groups, providing organizational and material 
resources. The intention is to recruit adherents and bind them as 
members across the right-wing movement in the long-term (e.g. 
Heinrich, 2008, p. 30). Geographically underdeveloped areas in 
East Germany with high unemployment rates are targeted by the 
NPD. According to its own public statements, the party 
compensates those social and cultural gaps in which the State 
withdraws infrastructure and social services. As a consequence, 
the NPD offers social and cultural programs to young low-
educated Germans in structurally underdeveloped areas (Roth, 
2003, p. 24).  
                                                 
23 http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/438/492792/text/  (10.01.2010)  
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‚The NPD is part of the right-wing movement but it is not clear 
whether young right-wing activists are fully loyal to the NPD 
party. The party has to offer alternative opportunities for young 
sympathizers who look for ‚cool‛ music instead of polka and 
folk’s music with old men and beer bars.‛ (Expert Interview 2011 
Jan Riebe) 
 
In 1993, social sciences began with a new discussion regarding 
the radical right-wing not purely as extremist, but as a social 
movement (Pfahl-Traughber 2003: 44). It was understood as a 
reaction against the influx of migration and ethnic diversity as 
well as globalization. The ‚intellectual‛ ideologues of the right-
wing adapted these issues formulating them to a new agenda. 
National-liberalism and the national conservatism belong to the 
theoretical key words of the right-wing movement. The Neo-
Nazi and Skinhead scenes represent the ideas on the street 
fighting with violent means. Different political strands have 
weakened the radical right-wing movement through rivalry (Art 
2011: 201; Uhrlau 1996: 12). The right-wing movement is 
heterogeneous, as different generations and ideological groups 
compete with each other. This led to discontinuous degrees of 
mobilization in East and West Germany.  
 
The pursuit of social movements for societal change requires the 
willingness to face opponents such as State and counter 
movements. Ideology is a necessary characteristic for each social 
movement to unite and mobilize collective support. The right-
wing movement contains these characteristics and uses them to 
mobilize collective protest. Ethno-centrism, anti-liberalism and 
anti-parliamentarian attitudes construct the opposite pole to the 
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democratic State and potential opponents from the political left 
(Rucht 2002: 78).    
 
  
4.2 The NPD within the movement 
The NPD was found in 1964 as the successor of a number of 
right-wing parties, which were either dissolved because of 
internal conflicts or banned by the State. As a pool of 
disappointed and grieved individuals, the NPD gathered right-
wing conservatives, old Nazi members and adherents of a new 
Nazi Germany (Dornbusch, 2008, p.18f.). A political party is 
sensible as the visibility is stronger when influencing the public 
discourse (Koopmans/Muis, 2008, p. 7).  Albeit, German media, 
academia and the State have been drawing an enormous amount 
of attention to the NPD, the party has never won a single 
parliamentarian seat in the Bundestag since 1945 (Art, 2011, p. 
191). Despite their constant failure as a parliamentarian party, 
the NPD has managed to win seats and to enter local parliaments 
in some regions of East Germany. Since 1996, Udo Voigt became 
the head of NPD, the party shifted strategically towards the self-
promotion of a social movement actor that would dedicate all its 
resources to the German people. At the same time, the NPD is an 
official parliamentarian party, which competes for electoral seats 
in local parliaments. The NPD uses an aggressive rhetoric 
including biological racism. For obvious historical reasons, this is 
a strong legal justification for legal sanctions by the German 
State and judiciary. Racism and hate speeches contradict with the 
basic fundaments of the free-democratic order of the German 
constitution. Due to the threat of legal banning by the State, the 
NPD started to embed its ideology-loaded issues in a strong 
social agenda. It improved its organizational structure and 
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developed strong links to violent skinhead groups and 
comradeships, which are usually not involved in the 
parliamentarian political process (Spiegel, 2012, p. 34).  They 
transmit their message through the media and manage to initiate 
campaigns, which are not limited to their own political or 
cultural milieus.  
 
Ten years after the Islamist terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
Germany discovers that a wave of Right-wing terrorist hits 
against its citizens on its own soil. A terrorist cell called National 
Socialist Underground (NSU) has some personal ties closely 
related to the NPD. This is particularly peculiar for the NPD, 
which barely survived a legal ban attempt in 2003 due to formal 
legal mistakes. Its strategy towards a less extremist but more 
socially acceptable party aimed to decrease its negative appeal to 
the public and lower State sanctions.    
 
At least four reasons can be named to explain why the NPD 
shifted its positioning. First, the NPD had to look for new voters 
who feel stigmatized and economically deprived after the 
reunification. Second, in order to look for new voters it had to 
promote an image of a conventional party. This leans towards 
extremism much less than expected. Its extremist image 
originates in its extremist positions and partly violent adherents. 
Third, this consequently leads to institutional repression through 
legal sanctions by the German state. As regard to the last point, 
the NPD had to compete with other right-wing parties such as 
the German Folks Union (DVU).   
 
